We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset-or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.
effects on negotiated outcomes of voting rules, outside options, private information, and other such factors. At the same time, however, a number of difficulties have arisen that cast doubt upon the robustness and predictive power of results in this area.
Two such difficulties are relevant here. Firstly, the bargaining protocols used in most theoretical and applied studies have at their heart an assumption of "temporal monopoly [power] " that has never been adequately defended. 1 And secondly, quite plausible models of negotiation can turn out to possess large sets of equilibria that are not always readily pruned by any compelling selection criterion. For conciseness let us refer to these as the "monopoly" and "multiplicity" problems, respectively.
In this paper we shall analyze a bargaining model that deals, to a limited extent, with both of the problems just mentioned. To combat the monopoly problem, we shall posit a simultaneous voting protocol that is symmetric among the participants and thus avoids allocating bargaining power arbitrarily in the form of permission to commit or to delay committing to an action. When similar "simultaneous-offer" games have been studied in the past (e.g., by Nash 1953; Chatterjee and Samuelson 1990), the conclusion (e.g., of Dekel 1990, p. 301) has been that they quickly run afoul of the multiplicity problem. But this can be handled, we shall find, by using dominance solvability rather than any variety of strategic equilibrium as our solution concept.
The combination of simultaneous moves and dominance analysis will allow us to work with a model that is in several respects exceedingly general. Our setting will encompass bargaining environments with any (finite) number of agents, an arbitrary (finite) set of alternatives, time preferences subject only to weak regularity assumptions, and a variety of different rules for reaching an agreement. The treatment of multilateral environments in particular is noteworthy because these have been shown (e.g., by Sutton 1986, pp. 721-723; Baron and Ferejohn 1989 , pp. 1189 -1190 to be highly susceptible to the multiplicity problem. 2 We shall, however, employ one structural assumption that is clearly restrictive: The negotiation must have a finite horizon so that backward induction can be used to organize the deletion of dominated strategies.
Our main result (Theorem 3.16) gives sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of the bargaining game in question and, when these hold, identifies the implied outcome of the interaction. No claim is made that the conditions are weak or likely to be satisfied in most situations of interest. 3 Indeed, it will be easy to exhibit economically relevant settings in which they fail. Our objectives, therefore, are modest ones: to show that the bargaining situations in a circumscribed but not negligible class
